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Goodrich: Public Policy in the Law of Conflicts

PUBLIC POLICY IN THE LAW OF CONFLICTS
HERBERT F. GOODRICH*
Every lawyer realizes the delicate accuracy of Maitland's
description of the law as a seamless web. At the same time
all who follow the profession know the practical necessity
of division and subdivision, of classification, of the use of
the mental tools called concepts. In every day use of its
rules and principles as applied to concrete sets of facts,
we must treat the law as though it were made up of separate parts. Much is being said today about a new grouping
of legal problems for study by law students. The comparative merits of the present orthodox classification and possible rearrangements of legal problems into some other
scheme is not in issue here. I want rather to present some
observations concerning that branch of legal principles
commonly known as Conflict of Laws, or, less commonly in
this country, Private International Law. Their correctness
or incorrectness will be the same whether the problems are
treated under a general heading called Conflict of Laws,
or are distributed about the various branches of the law
under some other scheme of classification.
A new name might be an improvement, for the present
term suggests misleading conceptions. There is no echo of
the clang of resounding arms in the Conflict of Laws section
of a law library. On the contrary it is a product of the
piping times of peace. A Conflict of Laws situation is
presented whenever a legal situation arises in which there is
a foreign element. By foreign is meant either another country, or another State of the United States. As described in
the opening section of the American Law Institute's lestatement: "The Conflict of Laws deals with the extent to
which the law of a State operates, and determines whether
the law of one or of another State governs a legal situation."
Conflict of Laws is of the younger generation in the
family of common law subjects. Its students find little material in the old cases in which strong, tough-minded judges
were laying down the rule in Shelly's case or applying the
Statute of Quia Emptores. Almost nothing appears of
*Dean of Law School, University of Pennsylvania.
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cases involving foreign claims or foreign claimants. Scholars in the Year Books have brought to light one interesting
decision from the reign of Edward the Second, in 1305.1
John brought his writ against William and in testimony of
the debt put forward a deed made at Berwich. Defendant's counsel objected: "You cannot take cognizance of this
deed which was made outside the -realm". This objection
was sustained. "And because it was made at Berwich", so
the report runs, "where this court has not cognizance, it was
awarded that John taken nothing by his writ". With this
terse but conclusive statement the curtain falls. It was not
uitil three hundred years later, after the union with Scotland, that Conflict of Laws decisions began to appear in the
English reports.
One wonders what went on with regard to these cases in
those three hundred years. Did no English merchant fail
to keep his agreement with a foreign trader? Did no foreign heir claim an English inheritance? Both of these things
must have happened, even in those dark days of difficult and
dangerous travel. Could it have been that the disputes
which we know must have arisen in the course of trade
were settled by the merchants in their own courts which
we now know were a part of every great fair? The law of
these courts was not the common law of England, nor the
civil law of the Holy Roman Empire. It was the "law
merchant" and was applied, presumably, regardless of
domicile or nationality of the disputants or the place of
their transactions. The court of Chancery too, during part
of this period, was assuming authority in some of the merchants' causes. The Chancellor's method, however, was to
refer the dispute to arbitrators, and enforce their award.
N1o body of substantive law, therefore, was built up by this
method.
Our common law of Conflict of Laws is of very modern
development. Mr. Justice Story's book did not appear until
1834 and it was for years thereafter the only book much
cited by common law courts in ;Conflict of Laws cases on
either side of the Atlantic. There was little case material
for Story to cite at the time his book appeared. He raised
many hypothetical problems, discussed what had been said
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on the subject by various continental writers, and fremany hypothetical probelms, discussed what had been said
quently followed the discussion with a guess of his own as
to what course might be followed by common law courts.
Story's book has had great influence upon the courts. Much
of it has been good; some of it unfortunate, as when an off
hand guess by the author has been made the basis of decision of rights of litigants without further examination of
principle or authority. Still more unfortunate has been the
citation of a passage which the judge has paraphrased from
some continental author as the opinion of Judge Story
himself. Such careless use has been too frequent.
It is easy to understand why this branch of the law has
been late in growth. For the development of principles of
conflict of laws there must, I take it, be a concurrence of
three conditions. First, there must be the existence of
different states governed by different rules of law. If th4
earth were all a part of the Holy Roman Empire, with the
same rules of law applicable in all parts, a possible difference in legal rights depending on a choice of law could
never be presented. Second, there must be full and peaceful intercourse between the people of these different states.
Third, lawyers and judges must have acquired enough of an
acquaintance with this branch of legal learning to sense a
conflict of laws problem when the facts of a given situation
present it.
Let us examine briefly, the second of these statements. A
man who lives his whole life in one spot from birth until
death, conducts his business and social affairs and has his
family about him, all in the same community, obviously
presents no problem where his lawyer must struggle with
the foreign element of a case. It is the modern age of
steam and electricity out of which the law of Conflict of
Laws can grow, not the era of stage coach and sailing vessel.
This branch of our law is as much a product of the revolution in transportation as the Gothic filling station or the
New York Stock Exchange.
That the growth of easy means of communication has
created new problems in law is an obvious truism. But its
application to Conflict of Laws is worth emphasizing, because it is the thing that turns this part of the law from
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the hands of a few specialists, as for instance is the case
in the practice in Admiralty, to a matter of concern to every
lawyer, whether his community be large or small. A few
homely instances will prove the point. Suppose, for instance, that a farmer from a hill county in West Virginia
orders a new tire for his Ford car from a Chicago mail
order house, sending a money order along with his letter.
The tire comes, but proves to be defective. Was the sale
made in Illinois? Does the Illinois law or the West Virginia law as to warranty of quality apply? Would it change
the case any, if the tire had been shipped to the farmer
direct from the maker in Akron, Ohio, on order to the
maker by the Chicago merchant? Suppose a man from
Marietta, Ohio, drives across the boundary river on an
errand to Parkersburg, West Virginia. His automobile is
struck by an interurban at one of those death trap crossings
between the two towns, and the victim is killed. Where may
suit be brought aginst the railroad for the damages suffered
from this death? Who may bring the action? What
state's law will determine the measure of damages? If West
Virginia decisions have established the point that to avoid
the charge of contributory negligence one must stop, listen,
and if necessary get out and look at a grade crossing, will
this rule be applicable if the suit is brought in Ohio? If a
judgment is recovered against the railroad company, what
persons will be entitled to share in the proceeds? What
law is to determine whether the stockholders are liable if the
company cannot pay?
Take another instance from every day life. A husband and
wife who live in Virginia made a trip to Chicago. Assume
that by Virginia law a married woman has not capacity
to contract; assume that in Illinois. a married woman may
make contracts as though she were single. This wife goes
shopping, buys on credit a new set of china for the family
table. Does Illinois or Virginia law determine whether she
may be held liable for the purchase price of the dishes? Is
it possible that she might be held liable if sued in Illinois
and not held liable if sued in Virginia? Illinois has a
statute making the spouses both liable for purchases by
either for family expenses. Could the Virginia husband be
held liable for the price of the dishes under this statute?
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The problems just stated have all arisen for settlement in
recent American cases. Dozens of others might be given.
They would be but cumulative evidence on the general point.
That point is that the business and personal lives of Americans, even those in the humblest circumstances, have transcended artificial state boundary lines. The answer to the
legal problems thus created is of importance to every member of the legal profession, whether he represents clients as
counsel or sits as a judge to determine legal rights and
liabilities.
The third element necessary for the development of Conflict of Laws principles is a recognition on the part of the
courts and counsel that the foreign element in a question
which has arisen for adjudication presents any different
problem than that which is presented when all the operative
facts have a domestic setting. It is highly probable that
more mistakes have been made by overlooking the foreign
element of a case altogether than in deciding what effect is
to be given it when counsel and court have it in mind. The
ignoring of the Conflict of Laws problem is shown in a
recent decision from the iSupreme 'Court of Minnesota .'
Suit was brought in Minnesota for injuries sustained in an
accident which took place during an automobile Tace at
the North Dakota state fair. One of the racing automobiles
left the track and plunged into the crowd of spectators,
killing one and injuring several others. The North Dakota
statute, giving the widow a right of action, was mentioned
by the court in discussing the question of liability. This is
the only significance given the foreign setting of the case.
The question of the responsibility of joint adventurers,
contributory negligence, and personal liability of corporate
officers were all well discussed but without a single reference
to North Dakota law, and this by an able judge of a strong
court whose decisions upon Conflict of Laws questions have
been conspicuously excellent. The decision may have, and
probably did, reach an entirely just result. But the absence
of significance given to its North Dakota factual setting
is left unanswered.
Such omissions are less frequent than they used to be;
'Ellingson
1928).

v. World Amusement Service Assn., 222 N. W. 335
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we may expect them to become less and less so as our lawyers and judges grow more familiar with the facts and the
law of two state transactions. While in many states Conflict of Laws is still not listed as a separate branch in which
an applicant for admission to the bar is to be examined,
almost all of our law schools offer fairly complete courses
in the field. Few men come to the bar today without at
least some knowledge of Conflict of Laws.
In spite of increased interest and increased knowledge,
even today we do not have an abundance of secondary material on the Anglo-American treatment of this interesting
fleld of law. In this country Story has been followed by
Wharton's book in three editions, the last of which is very
helpful. The late Professor Minor's book has been much
used. Fortunately it is to be kept up to date by a new
edition now in course of preparation by Dean William Van
Vleck of the George Washington University Law School.
Westlake's Private International Law is a good English
book, although it is over-shadowed by that of Professor
Dicey. Dicey on Conflict of Laws has gone through four
editions. It is clear, well written, reliable and scholarly.
Like many English authors he seldom if ever ventures beyond either decision or dicta of the ruling English cases,
but for a quick and dependable reference to the law of
Great Britain, Dicey can hardly be improved upon. Our
American digest system has no topic heading "Conflict of
Laws", although the publishers are working upon plans for
its inclusion. Without such heading, ready access to decisions in the larger topics can be had by examination of
the sub-heading under the title "What Law Governs". The
newer encyclopedias such as Ruling Case Law, and Corpus
Juris, have a treatment of Conflict of Laws, with appropriate
cross references to discussions of .Conflict of Laws questions
in other parts of the work. The various annotated series
of case reports are highly useful in work upon Conflict of
Laws problems, both for the selection of important new
decisions, and the exhaustive notes upon the cases reported.
The law reviews, especially those published by our American
law schools, are a mine of valuable material on all phases
of the subject. The wealth of new decisions upon im-

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol36/iss2/3

6

Goodrich: Public Policy in the Law of Conflicts

WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
portant points makes easy the problem of selection of interesting material for comment. In the Michigan Law Review for 1926-1927 there appeared twenty-eight comments
on recent decisions which seemed important enough for discussion; in the following year (1927-1928) twenty-six. This
was in addition to leading articles on wider phases of the
various problems than could be covered in a short comment.
The comments for one year covered a wide range. Jurisdiction over foreign corporations, annulment of marriages,
suits against absent non-resident motorists, foreign marriages, custody of children in divorce suits, enforcement of
foreign judgments, survival of claims for tort-these are a
few interesting samples from the list. The Law Library
Journal Index to Legal Periodicals for 1927, which covers
the principal law journals printed in English contains sixtynine paragraph headings under Conflict of Laws. This, of
course, is in addition to such problems in that subject as
may have been treated and indexed under some other heading. The lack of attention to questions of Conflict of Laws
in the sixteenth century is amply compensated for by the
activity of the student of the law three hundred years
later.
II.
One who talks about this phase of learning may well be
called upon to show any reason for its existence. Why do
we need rules for these cases with something foreign in
them, in addition to all the trouble courts and lawyers are
compelled to take in settling purely domestic disputes?
One might ask further, why bother with foreign cases at
all? Piresumably no one would want to go so far as to
make a general rule along the line of the English decision
in 1318, already mentioned, and say that if the particular
case has a foreign setting we shall have nothing whatever to
do with it. That would be too obviously inconvenient for too
many people. One against whom a claim is made could
escape liability altogether by remaining away from the place
where his obligation was imposed. Many cases, too, involve
events which have taken place in two or more states, and
have therefore a foreign element in them no matter where
presented for settlement. The very inter-state and interna-
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tional movements of Americans makes such a parochial
limitation of enforcement of legal rights an impossible one.
It is surprising to find though how frequently there appears
legislative expressions of hostility to the local trial of foreign claims, or litigation by foreign claimants. This hostility
appears in statutes closing the local courts to the trial of
certain types of foreign claims, of which that for death by
wrongful act is a common example. Such statutes probably
have no general significance in view of the well established
and almost universally accepted doctrine permitting suit on
a claim regardless of its place of origin wherever pers6nal
jurisdiction over the defendant may be obtained.
A more searching question may be put. Why should there
be any special rules made for foreign cases? For example,
take the situation supposed above, where the Ohio man
driving from Marietta to Parkersburg was killed at the railway crossing on the West Virginia side of the river. If a
plaintiff chooses to sue in Ohio to recover the damages resulting from this distressing accident, why should the Ohio
court be asked to apply any different rules of law to the
case than if it had occurred between Marietta and Zanesville, Ohio, assuming the other facts to be identical?
The answer to this fundamental question is seldom found
stated in reading the decisions. But it is nevertheless a
major premise, even if an unarticulated major premise, upon
which many elaborate doctrines are based. The premise,
spelled out, must be that fairness to these parties requires
a different treatment of a West Virginia set of facts in an
Ohio law suit than is given an Ohio set of facts which is
just the same except for the fact of a state boundary between them. To that series of events which took place in
West Virginia and culminated in the collision and the death
of the driver of the motor car, the law of West Virginia
attached certain consequences. Assume one of such consequences to be that the widow of the victim was given a
claim against the railway company for $5,000. If it were
not paid, she was entitled to go to court and secure an
order, in the form of a judgment, that she was entitled to
this amount from the company. Her rights thus acquired
should not be changed by the fact that for one reason or another enforcement of them by legal action is presented
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somewhere else than at the scene of the accident. Nor
should the defendant's obligation to her, as thus fixed, be
changed, either by being increased or diminished by this
fact. Fairness to the parties requires that the obligations
created between them remain unchanged by fortuituous
changes in the geographical locations of either until such
obligations are settled or otherwise discharged.
Other instances may properly be given, since the point
is a fundamental one. Two people in Massachusetts made
an agreement, whereby one promises to do certain things
for the other. They reduce their terms to writing, each
signs his name and follows his signature by a seal. By the
rules prevailing in Massachusetts the agreement is legally
binding upon both parties. A question concerning the contract comes up in Minnesota, where the legislature has
passed a statute abolishing the common law significance
of the seal. Shall this Massachusetts agreement be denied
effect in Minnesota because, in that state, a different method
must be followed to make a promise binding at law? Or is
it the fairer thing to -recognize and give effect to the consequences that Massachusetts law attributed to this Massachusetts transaction. The latter answer appears the only
fair one, either upon a first and non-technical reaction, or
upon further .reflection and study. Both a sense of fairness and a consideration of general commercial convenience
require that when a matter has been settled, in conformity
with the law then and there controlling the actions of the
parties, the settlement should not be disturbed because the
point arises for litigation somewhere else.
In instances involving personal relations the appeal for
uniform treatment becomes, emotionally, at least, even
stronger. A child born prior to the marriage of its parents
is legitimated under the law where they all live, by the
subsequent marriage of its father and mother. Is the child
to be tainted with the stain of bastardy if it comes into
some other state where no legitimating effect is given to
local marriages subsequent to the birth of a child? Again,
should a man and woman be treated as divorced in one
state as still married to each other in a second? Of course
the answer ought to be no, but such scandal unfortunately
is not unknown to the law. We have too many instances

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1930

9

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 2 [1930], Art. 3
PUBLIC POLICY
IN1 THE LAW OF CONFLICTS 165

where a spouse has secured a divorce and remarried only
to find that in some other state the second marriage will
not be recognized and the relations of the parties are considered meretricious. In some instances the situation has
arisen beause of the fraud and perjury of the individuals
concerned. In others the unfortunate situation is due to
differences among courts as to the law. Tith the first class,
we can give little help. The way of the trangressor is purposely made hard. But the second class should be an object
of anxiety and concern to all who follow the law.
Fairness demands that once one's rights and liabilities
are settled under the law, those same rights and liabilities
shall be the measure of legal obligation everywhere. This
fundamental premise is at the bottom of nearly every Conflict of Laws case. Rights thus acquired, obligations thus
imposed, should be recognized and enforced wherever occasion may demand, unless an exception is to be made where
some countervailing rule of policy or expediency precludes
it. Such a possible exception will be mentioned later.
If the soundness of what has been called the fundamental
premise be granted, it must not be concluded that the settlement of all Conflict of Laws problems has been automatically made. No magic "Open Sesame" has been provided. We axe, in fact, only at the threshold of the questions which must be answered in the development of our
doctrines of Conflict of Laws. Sometimes the questions are
not difficult. In our case of the automobile wreck, for example, all of our setting was made up of West Virginia
properties, except the Ohio man and his car. It is not hard
to conclude that the habitat either of man or car is not an
important element in determining what state's tort rules
are to apply in determining the legal consequences of this
accident. American courts would unanimously agree that
wherever the case was tried the rules of West Virginia tort
law would be applicable.
But all problems are not so easily settled. Admitting
that when rights are once settled under a contract which is
valid they should be given effect everywhere, what law shall
we look to, to determine whether a valid contract has been
made? Suppose a New York business man dictates an
answer accepting an offer of a manufacturing house to sell

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol36/iss2/3

10

Goodrich: Public Policy in the Law of Conflicts

WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
him a quantity of merchandise at a stated price. The seller
does business in Chicago, delivery of the goods is to be in
St. Louis. The letter of acceptance comes to our business
man's desk just before closing on Saturday noon. He signs
it and being the last one to leave the office, decides to mail
it himself. He put it in his pocket, but forgets all about
it until he gets to the country club in New Jersey, where
he is to play golf that afternoon. He mails the letter from
the club. What state's contract law is to fix the rights
of parties under this agreement?
Another instance: an Illinois man wanted to borrow some
money to repair his house. He visited his brother-in-law
in Ohio, borrowed the money and gave his note for the
amount. He promised to pay the note the next summer
when his brother-in-law visited him in Illinois. The -rate
of interest stipulated for was illegal by Ohio law but valid
by Illinois law. Which should be applied if the question
arose in West Virginia?
Every layman who reads the newspapers has heard of
this or that famous or notorious person who has gone to
Paris or Reno to procure a divorce from an unsuccessful
marriage. A short time ago there appeared in the press
what purported to be an interview with Senor Arturo del
Toro who was called the "father of the divorce law in
Sonora, Mexico". He is reported to have said:
"Sonora has supplanted both Reno and Paris as
the mecca of unhappily married couples, for there is
no residential requirement attached to its decrees.
They call me an enemy of Cupid, but my sole aim is
to bring happiness to the thousands of mismated
couples in this country. I think I am Cupid's ally,
for the way through a Sonora divorce court leads to
new life for those shackled by the inhuman publicity
which attends open divorces in this country.
"Simplicity itself is the procedure of a Sonora
decree", Senor Del Toro explains. "Three papers are
necessary-a power of attorney signed by the plaintiff, one signed by the defendant, and a copy of the
marriage certificate. The plaintiff will be unable to
present himself in the Sonora courts to sign the
petition? Regrettable, but it can be arranged. It
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will take a little longer, perhaps two months in all.
If you can go yourself to Sonora, or get your partner
in misery to go it will take but six weeks." 2
Among well known persons who were stated to have been
this gentleman's clients are Dolores del Rio, motion picture
actress, Mlle. Alda, of the Metropolitan Opera Company;
Georgette Cohan, daughter of George M. Cohan.
The question of the effect to be given a foreign divorce
has been before courts in this country scores of times. The
Supreme Court of Iowa very recently refused to recognize
the legality of a Mexican decree given under circumstances
similar to those described by the Mexican lawyer in his
newspaper interview.3 Persons who have remarried after
securing divorces in states where they did not make their
homes, have been convicted of bigamy and sent to jail. There
is overwhelming support for the statement that a divorce
granted to an individual in a state in which he does not
make his home will not be given effect elsewhere.'
The instances just given could easily be increased one
hundred fold by anyone who has devoted any considerable
thought and study to CGnflict of Laws problems. They
show, I hope, two things': (1) that the problems are difficult; (2) that their solution in terms of certainty is
tremendously desirable. It is not alone for the people who
get into a law suit that we need to have our law of Conflict of Laws in certain terms. Of far more importance are
the thousands of persons who seek to avoid litigation by a
careful compliance with the law which is to govern their
conduct. They should be able to know what rule of law is
to govern them and have reasonable confidence that this
rule of law will be the measure of their rights and obligations whenever and wherever the. question may subsequently
arise. They do not ask that Florida change its rules of
contract, or property, or divorce, to conform to those of
New York. They only ask that it be made clear which
state's law they shall comply with in order that conduct in
2Detroit Free Press, Jan. 29,
203 Ia.
Baumann v. Baumann, 228 N. Y.
213 (1929).
4 See GooDRIcH oF CONFLICT OF
S Bonner v. Reandrew,

1929.
1355, 214 N. W. 536 (1927), and see
S. 539 (1928), noted in 29 Col. L. Rev.
LAWS, pp. 284 et seq.
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accordance with the rule governing shall be given the same
legal effect everywhere. Judge Cardozo in his brilliant little book called "Paradoxes of Legal Science", deals with the
conflicting demands of fluidity and certainty in the law.
"The play of imagination upon the material in the legal
store-room does not", he says, "always evoke the spirit of
change. There are times when it will yield the answer
that rest should be preferred to motion . . . . One finds it
• . in one of the most baffling subjects of legal science,
the so-called Conflict of Laws .... The walls of the compartments must be firm, the lines of demarcation plain,
or there will be overlappings and encroachments with incongruities and clashes. In such circumstances, the finality of the rule is in itself a jural aim."
As I see it, this is the picture: We live in a civilization
where state and even national boundary lines no longer
have much to do with our every day lives. We conduct our
affairs, both business and social, without regard to them.
But such lines do have legal significance. Each nation, and
in this country, each state, has its own law-making and lawenforcing machinery. This will continue to be the situation
unless there is a sweeping revolutionary change, no signs
of which are apparent at present. But we may expect in
the future, as easy communication further develops, even
less significance in boundary lines in the life of the private
citizen pursuing his own affairs. It is the task of the legal
profession to make the facts of twentieth century life fit into
this political scheme with a maximum of fairness and a
minimum of friction. We must work out the principles
which determine the selection of the state's law which is to
govern a transaction with elements in it from a dozen different places. The solution must be a just one to the
parties; it must be so clear as to be easily understood and
applied. it must be one that all courts can and will follow. We deal here with a different sort of question than
that presented where the problem is confined to one state.
Clarity is highly desirable anywhere in the law. But there
is no extreme necessity that the property law of West Virginia or that the contract law of West Virginia be the same
as that of Michigan. Each state can apply its own rules
to West Virginia and Michigan local affairs respectively
and no one will be seriously inconvenienced. But it is ex-
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ceedingly necessary that if a New York contract comes before a court either in Michigan or West Virginia or Iowa
or Kansas that the court apply the same rule of Conflict
of Laws to determine the treatment which this foreign contract is to receive. If it does not, the parties will find that
which they thought definitely and legally settled, varying
according to the court in which questions between them may
happen by chance to be raised. Conflict of Laws must be
made clear and it must be made uniform.
Here is a task that demands the best legal brains we can
bring to its settlement. The problems do not come "silently
one by one" like the stars in "Evangeline", but crowd in upon us all at once. When we remember that in our own
lifetime we have seen the development of telephones, radio
automobiles, paved highways, and airplanes the reason is
not far to seek. Wharton said in the preface to the second
edition of his Conflict of Laws in 1881 that the number of
Common Law decisions had doubled since he had written
the first edition, which appeared in 1870. In Wharton's
time the age of steam and electricity had only begun. The
real development has come since. The legal questions come
before courts alioost faster than they can be answered, much
faster than they can be carefully considered. We need careful, critical study into every phase of Conflict of Laws
problems by all the trained lawyers who can be induced to
give their attention to them. Accumulated decisions must
be re-read and re-analyzed, the operation of the law in action
observed, social considerations carefully determined. The
courts cannot do it alone. In many of our appellate bodies
each member is expected to write from eighty to one hundred opinions a year, in addition to hearing arguments of
cases, sitting on motions, and transacting routine business.
The judges must have help. The opportunity is a tremendously stimulating challenge to legal scholarship.
We may confidently expect, in our deepening understanding of Conflict of Laws and its problems, to see an ever
diminishing amount of the petty provincialism that marred
its growth in the last century. Such provincialism has
shown itself in so great a tribunal as the Supreme Court
of the United States when the majority of the judges
(against strong dissent it should be parenthetically stated)
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refused to give effect to a French judgment in America.'
It has appeared in numerous instances where a court which
has been asked to give effect to an out-of-the-state transaction has refused to do so for the reason that the local public
policy forbade.
That there is a rule of Conflict of Laws which states that
a court will not enforce a foreign claim when enforcement
is deemed contrary to the public policy of the forum, is
well settled. At least it is as well established as anything
can be which has -been declared and re-declared over and
over again by judges and text-writers. But "public policy
of the forum" is an elastic kind of a grab bag from which
one can take out anything which he chooses to put in.
Applied in its broadest sense, the doctrine might run something like this: the public policy of this state is declared in
the rules of law laid down by our courts and those enacted
into statutes by ouir legislature. If you present to us a claim
arising from a set of facts occurring outside the state, we
will not give you relief unless under our law a similar claim
would have arisen if the facts had had a domestic setting.
To do so would violate the policy of our own state as shown
in its established rules on such facts.
No court nowadays would enunciate or apply the doctrine so baldly as this. Says the keen-sighted Judge Cardozo, "We are not so provincial as to say that every solution of a problem is wrong because we deal with it otherwise at home".' But as one reads through the decisions
on Conflict of Laws there appear too many instances where
a foreign solution of a problem is denied local effect because the domestic solution is different. Such an attitude
is not surprising. Any account of the early history of our
nation will show the jealousies, the controversies, and
suspicions that existed among the people of our several
states. It is only natural that such an attitude should come
to the surface in judicial decisions.
To refuse local effect to a foreign claim when the claimed
right arises in a foreign country is unfortunate. As among
the States of our Union it is absurd. We have a common
5Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U. S. 113 (1895).
6Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N. Y. 99, 120 X. E. 198 (1918).
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law, a common language, a common national government.
Our differences may be dear to us but they are all minor
in their nature. It is highly unbecoming for one of our
number to take the attitude that another's solution of a
legal question is so highly offensive to its sense of justice
that it will receive no recognition in the latter's courts.
Take a concrete instance: New York and New Jersey have
somewhat different rules regarding what speculative contracts are permissible. Some agreements permitted in New
York are condemned by New Jersey as gambling affairs and
they are declared void. Such an agreement, made in New
tork where valid has been refused enforcement in New
Jersey as against New Jersey policy.7 Yet thousands of N'ew
Jersey citizens are as much a part of the business life of
New York as are those who dwell on Manhatten Island. It
would be hard to find a more striking instance of "an intolerable affectation of superior virtue" by one state toward
another.'
Further, there is something to be said about a phase of
public policy that such a decision as that mentioned overlooks. There surely is a policy both of good morals and
commercial stability in giving legal effect to agreement lawfully made. To deny enforcement to the foreign made contract makes the state of the forum a shelter for those who
refuse to perform their legal obligations. Unlike the cases
where a court refuses relief to persons in pari delicto, such
a rule penalizes the obligor who, by hypothesis, was doing
nothing forbidden by law when and where his contract was
made. Both morality and expediency are opposed to such
a conclusion.
Fortunately we may say with high confidence that this
attitude is passing. As we get about our own and other
countries more easily and more often we become not only
less suspicious of other people's food and customs, but of
their legal institutions as well. As those of us who are
lawyers grow to a better understanding of Conflict of Laws
problems, we see in their application the principle of tol7 Flagg v. Baldwin, 38 N. J. Eq. 219

(1884).
8 The words are those of Mr. Justice Beach. See "Interstate Enforcement of Vested Rights," 27 YALE L. J. 656 (1918).
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erance known as live and let live. We see that the full
recognition of foreign rights according to the law which
governed their creation is no abdication of our own sovereignty but the application of the principle of fairness
voluntarily made by ourselves. Such fair and impartial application by ourselves invites hs to the confident expectation
that transactions occuring under the goverance of our laws
will receive the same fair treatment by other courts.
Another means of improving our law of Conflict ,of Laws
will be a better understanding of its principles. In the
older cases and textbooks, we find repeated over and over
again the statement that the foreign law has no force locally
except by comity. Its application, therefore, was to be
denied when it conflicted vitally with a contrary rule established by local court or legislature. With this conception of the operation of a foreign rule or law, it is not surprising that courts were reluctant to displace their own good
rules with what seemed to them inferior foreign products.
The use of the term "comity" in this connection has probably been responsible for much misunderstanding. Where
the rule of the foreign law is applied simply as a matter of
courtesy to another state, adjudication of rights according
to the rule of the foreign law rests on a very weak foundation. The real basis of Conflict of Laws rules would probably no longer be seriously disputed. We know that a court
applies only the law of its own state. But the principles
of Conflict of Laws are just as much a part of a state's local
law as are its rules governing descent of property, contracts,
or a right of action for assault. When a court has before
it a case involving a foreign element, its principles of Conflict of Laws determine whether it applies the rule to that
set of facts which would have been applied if they had all
occurred locally, or whether a foreign law is to be applied
because of the presence of the foreign facts. Perhaps an
illustration will make the point clear. When a man dies
without a will, his personal property is distributed according to the laws prevailing at his domicile at the time of
his death. It has sometimes been said that the law of the
domicile had in that case an extra-territorial operation; that
somehow it reached out and determined the succession of
that property from the dead to the living. We now know
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that this is not the case. We recognize now that the rule
of distribution is that of the domicile at death but we know
it is because the Conflict of Laws rule prevailing generally
has adopted this principle as one of convenience. The state
where the property is may change it by statute if it pleases.
This has been done in Illinois and Mississippi. If it is
tangible property, only the state where it is may tax its
transfer upon the death of the owner. The rule of distribution is that of the situs of the property. But where the
property had a foreign owner, the rule of distribution applied by the state of the situs is not that on its own statute
bdok, but that of the owner's domicile. When it is
recognized that Conflict of Laws is just as much a part of
the municipal law of each state as any other branch of law
administered by its courts, much of the suspicion attached
to the application of foreign rules drop away. The use
of the term "comity" in this connection may well be restricted to the number of guns to be fired in salute to a
foreign admiral and the place which a sister-in-law of a
visiting ambassador is to occupy at an official dinner.
There is one point in the decision of cases involving Conflict of Laws problems which is not so easily disposed of. If
our ideal could be perfectly carried out, the enforcement of
a claim acquired under foreign law would not only give
the person entitled to it what the foreign law gave him,
but it would give it to him in exactly the same way. Obviously a perfect realization of this ideal was impossible.
When a man comes to a local court to enforce a right which
he claims to have acquired under the law of another state,
he must as a practical matter take the local machinery of
justice as he finds it. We could not possibly, for instance,
give a man with a claim for breach of a French contract a
new system of procedure which would enforce his claim the
way a French court would enforce it. This practical difficulty has led to a statement of the rule that matters of
substance are governed by the law of the place which
creates the right, but matters of procedure are governed by
the law of the forum. Like so many generalizations, this
rule is easy to state but difficult to apply. What is a matter
of procedure and what is a matter of substance? Suppose
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that the law of a place where the injury happens make contributory negligence a matter of defense by the defendant,
but that the law of the place where the case is tried makes
such a proof a part of the plaintiff's case. Must the plaintiff
conform to the rule of the forum? Clearly it is going to
make a great practical difference with the outcome of his
case which rule is applied.
The question is a difficult one. There is no litmus paper
test which will give you blue for substance and pink for
procedure. Professor Lorenson has pointed out that in the
development of Conflict of Laws rules in England during
the eighteenth century, the English courts, impatient at
the differing foreign laws, were inclined to treat as procedure everything which could be thrown into that category. Such a state of mind is pretty well past by now.
But the problem has not disappeared and probably never
can disappear. Local procedural differences may continue
to have important practical effects upon the individuals
concerned in a particular case. The best we can do is to
give the parties, so far as local machinery permits, what
they are entitled to under the rules of law which govern
their transaction.
We have thus come to the recognition of what Judge
Cardozo has happily called a wider public policy. The
acceptance of this wider public policy will give us a more
nearly perfect body of rules in the great and important
field of Conflict of Laws. More than that, it will develop a
closer relation among the citizens of our own beloved country, and a better understanding among the peoples of the
earth.
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